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EU-China Relations on Climate Change Policies and The Role of Bilateral Cooperation
for a Global Climate Change Regime
Astrid Carrapatoso1
Abstract
What must the European Union do to make China commit to binding regulations on
greenhouse gases? China has been one of the major veto players with regard to binding rules
on carbon emissions in context of the Kyoto Protocol and the negotiations of a Post-Kyoto
arrangement. And yet, China is one of the largest polluters in this respect. Because of its
economic growth rates, emissions are likely to rise in the future. It is therefore necessary to
find viable solutions that encourage China to limit and finally reduce greenhouse gas
emissions. In contrast, the EU has internationally showed leadership in climate change
policy. The EU is often considered as a normative power, i.e. having the ideational power to
define what can be perceived ‘normal’ on the international level.
The question is whether the bilateral cooperation between the EU and China on
climate issues can help to (a) promote norms and values and generate an increased awareness
of climate change both on the political and societal level, (b) establish comprehensive
environmental policy frameworks on a bilateral basis with a positive impact on national
policy making and (c) positively influence environmental policy making on the international
level such as the Post-Kyoto negotiations on climate change.
This paper seeks to set a research agenda for the exploration of the EU’s normative
power with regard to climate change policy in China. As the main research objective will be
to find out about the acceptance and adaptation of norms related to climate change, the
concept of normative power and the discussion on norm diffusion and norm localization will
be central to this analysis. Furthermore, this study will be embedded in the debate on ‘new
bilateralism’, thus concentrating on new actors, agendas and instruments in bilateral
relations.
Introduction
To institutionalize and enhance their cooperation on climate change issues, the European
Union (EU) and China agreed on a partnership agreement in 2005, which sets out key
objectives for further efforts to jointly address the issue of climate change. This declaration
was translated into a Rolling Action Plan (RWP) in 2006. Since then, the EU and China
regularly launched bilateral consultations and summits to further develop joint projects such
as, for example, the COACH project (Cooperation Action with CCS China-EU). The joint
declaration is meant to “fully complement the UN Framework Convention on Climate
Change and the Kyoto Protocol. It will strengthen cooperation and dialogue on climate
change including clean energy, and will promote sustainable development” (EC 2009). This
comment raises three questions that will guide this research: (a) Will this cooperation merely
include technical issues or does it have the potential to promote the norm of sustainable
development and climate change being part of it? (b) Will such a bilateral cooperation be
successful in establishing sound environmental policy frameworks on a national basis? (c)
Will bilateral cooperation on climate change such as the one between the EU and China help
or hinder the development of a global climate change regime after the Kyoto Protocol will
have expired? These questions will become crucial in the light of the upcoming negotiations
of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in Copenhagen in
December 2009. Here, member states will decide on the future directions of global climate
change policy making and the integration of China into such an agreement and China’s
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acceptance on quantitative emission goals will be decisive. At the UNFCCC conference in
Bali in 2007, China for the first time agreed on discussing these issues in context of a PostKyoto-Protocol. Whether this leads into a binding commitment will not only depend on
China’s willingness to do so but also on the industrialized nations’ assistance in developing
and implementing climate change policies in China and in giving the right incentives for
China to also independently set up policies to address problems causing and caused by
climate change. Both the EU and the U.S. will play an important role in this respect.
The objective of this research project is to explore the sources of EU and Chinese
climate change policy making and the role and function of EU-China relations on climate
change policy for international relations. To find out about the sources will help to map
existing or potential cooperation between European and Chinese actors. Based on the
assumption that official cooperation frameworks such as the above mentioned joint
declaration are not only implemented through political actors but also through business and
civil society actors, one research goal of this project is to find out about both political and
societal actors involved in this cooperation. Furthermore, this analysis wants to illustrate EUChina cooperation on different levels, i.e. projects on the political, business and civil society
level to explore the nature and key aspects of EU-China bilateral relations.
The analysis will be embedded in the debate on ‘new bilateralism’ (Kiatpongsan
2008), ‘bilateral inter-regionalism’ (Ponjaert 2008) or ‘quasi-interregionalism’ (Hänggi 2006)
and blended with insights gained from foreign policy analysis (Hudson 2005;
Goldstein/Keohane 1993; Boekle/Rittberger/Wagner 1999; Risse 2000). New bilateralism
focuses on new actors beyond government-to-government relations, new agendas also
emphasizing issue linkages such as trade and environment or sustainable development and
new instruments that include ‘multiple issue-specific alliances’, which means that bilateral
agreements focus on specific policy areas (Kiatpongsan 2008; Smith/Tsatsas 2002). The
study of EU-China relations on climate change policy therefore seeks to explore both the
political and societal actors involved in climate change policy making, their objectives and
motivations, the climate change agenda, the instruments to be used, including strategic
dialogues, summits, track-two-diplomacy and policy networks and the effect of these bilateral
relations on the international system. Furthermore, as this study deals with the promotion and
establishment of the norm of sustainable development in context of climate change, this
analysis will be guided by the literature on the EU as a normative power and the aspect of
norm localization (Manners 2002; Acharya 2004). Here, the question refers to the ideational
power of the EU “to shape conceptions of ‘normal’ in international relations” (Manners 2002:
239), i.e. to promote its ideas on climate change policies in a multilateral and bilateral
context. Acharya reflects this process from the perspective of the norm-taker, which means
that he asks about the process of adapting external norms and ideas “to meet local practices”
(Acharya 2004: 251). The question is on which levels such norms are promoted and
localized. The analysis of both the political and societal level is therefore necessary.
Methodologically, the analysis of EU-China relations on climate change issues
consists of two parts. First, a theoretical discussion of ‘new bilateralism’, ‘interregionalism’
in addition to Europe as a normative power and norm localization will lead to an analytical
framework for the exploration of environmental foreign policy making in context of bilateral
inter-regional relations. Constructing an analytical framework out of these concepts and
theories is challenging on several counts:
(a) the major focus of the ‘new bilateralism’ and ‘interregionalism’ debate has been
on trade and economic issues and has not been applied to environmental issues yet,
(b) considering the EU as a normative power leads us to constructivist foreign policy
theory, which deals with norms, values and belief systems. This not only bears
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definitional problems but requires profound cultural knowledge; moreover, the
security agenda still dominates foreign policy analysis so that an analysis of
environmental foreign policy making needs a clarification of environmental norms,
(c) the concept of the EU as a normative power is highly contested and needs further
clarification with regard to environmental issues.
(d) foreign policy analysis of both international and bilateral environmental
cooperation is close to non-existent so that only few academic writings can serve as
reference points.
The major objective of the theoretical part will thus be to work out the main characteristics of
‘new bilateralism’ such as actors, agendas and instruments (e.g. Kiatpongsan 2008), the
sources of climate change policy making, the functions of interregional relations such as
agenda-setting or identity-building (e.g. Rüland 2001), and the role of norms as part of the
constructivist agenda (e.g. Risse 2000; Sedelmaier 2004), including the EU’s role as a
normative power (e.g. Manners 2002) and the perception of this role or reaction by China.
The theoretical part will be followed by an empirical analysis of EU-China relations
with regard to climate change policy. The analysis will be done in three stages:
(a) On a sub-systemic level, the sources of the EU’s and China’s climate change
policy behaviour will be identified. This is crucial to explain the two parties’
motivations for bilateral cooperation in environmental issues. Here, the focus lies in
domestic and societal aspects of climate change policy making.
(b) On a systemic level, the EU and China will be considered as the primary actors in
bilateral relations and their interaction on the bilateral level will be explored.
(c) The analysis will then continue to link the sub-systemic with the systemic level,
thus highlighting the role of societal actors including business in the implementation
of policies decided on at the systemic level.
(d) In a final step, the interplay between bilateral cooperation and the international
system will be analyzed. The challenge is here to work out causalities between the
bilateral and multilateral level.
The research will follow a discourse analytical design. To begin with the research
process, I will explore the relevant discourses regarding EU-China cooperation on climate
change. The discourses will be identified on both the sub-systemic and systemic level, i.e.
discourses on the business and civil society level as well as on the level of EU-China political
relations. The analysis will be based on a document analysis and qualitative interviews. The
study of EU-China relations with regard to climate change will be based on the analysis of
primary and secondary sources, i.e. academic literature to be found in university libraries and
the internet, legal documents, official (government) websites and press releases (such as
http://europa.eu), media releases (official newspapers), websites from societal actors such as
environmental non-governmental organizations or foundations (e.g. Asia-Europe
Foundation), websites and documents from business, documentation of strategic dialogues
and summits (including the Asia-Europe Meeting, ASEM), documentation of the work of
policy and scientific networks (e.g. Green Diplomacy Network). This document analysis will
be complemented by qualitative interviews – narrative and expert interviews -, which are
based on a semi-structured questionnaire to allow for greater flexibility in more or less
informal interview situations. The selection of interviewees will be based on a network
approach.
The methodological tools will be complemented by the method of process tracing.
This helps to understand the causal relationships between different variables over time. The
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analysis starts with the establishment of the EU-China Strategic Partnership in 2005 and
follows the current negotiations on a Post-Kyoto Arrangement until a final agreement is
decided on in Copenhagen 2009. To remain flexible, the period to be analysed might be
expanded.
As the research project is in its early stages, this paper is meant to explore the
theoretical dimension of this research agenda and give a first broad overview of the empirical
part. I will focus on the concepts of new bilateralism and norm localization as a possible
analytical framework for the outlined research project. I will then continue to outline existing
cooperation between the EU and China on climate change policies, identify incentives for
China to strengthen and deepen cooperation with the EU in this respect and to describe
instruments that are or might be important in this cooperation. Possible actors that could act
as norm promoters and norm takers will be worked out.
New Bilateralism – What Is The Concept About?
The concept of new bilateralism was introduced in the 1980s (e.g. Haggard/Cheng 1989) and
has since been discussed under the terms of inter-regionalism (e.g. Rüland 2001) or quasiinterregionalism (e.g. Hänggi 2006). Scholars became interested in the changing nature of
international relations and the emergence of new forms of bilateral cooperation instead of
relying merely on multilateral structures. This observation could specifically be made in the
area of trade and finance. A well-known phenomenon is the boom of bilateral and inter- or
cross-regional free trade agreements in the Asia-Pacific region since the end of the 1990s
(e.g. Dent 2006). Ravenhill (2003) sees new bilateralism as a reaction to the failure of
existing international and regional institutions and the positive effects that could be
established through new forms of bilateralism. The main research question is why states
actively pursue these new forms of bilateral cooperation despite the advantages of
multilateralism that are widely accepted by policy makers. The related question refers to the
short-term and long-term impacts of new bilateralism for the international system.
The main characteristics of new bilateralism can also be derived from the literature on
new regionalism. Rüland (2001) identifies four key features of new regionalism:
•
•
•
•

more diffuse membership,
growing agenda complexity,
development of its own organizational infrastructure,
emergence of new independent actors.

Kiatpongsan (2008) translates these features into new bilateralism by concentrating on
new actors, agendas and instruments. On a government-to-government basis, new actors
particularly come in on the level of track-two diplomacy. Here, corresponding officials,
academics or experts become important players. Furthermore, business and civil society
actors regularly participate in this kind of interaction (ibid.: 23). The traditional agendas of
bilateral relations – economy, security, development – are conceptually modified. With
regard to the economy, for instance, more sensitive issues such as the environment or
agriculture are addressed in bilateral agreements (e.g. Fritz Carrapatoso 2007). The security
agenda now follows a more comprehensive understanding of the security concept, thus
integrating non-conventional security issues including topics such as, for example, the
environment (ibid.: 27; see also Buzan/Weaver/de Wilde 1998; WBGU 2008;
Diehl/Gleditsch 2001). The development agenda has shifted away from the traditional aid
pattern and is now strongly based on issue-linkages. This means that development objectives
are now linked to, for example, trade or security policies (ibid.: 32).
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States or regions decide to establish bilateral relations in addition to multilateral
efforts for many reasons. Smith and Tsatsas (2002:3-9) highlight the following factors
determining bilateral relations:
•
•
•
•
•

Geographical, historical, religious, cultural and trade factors influence the scope and
depth of bilateral relations.
Pragmatism is a key factor, i.e. choosing partners with compatible interests to achieve
shared objectives.
Existing personal ties and regular contact between political actors facilitate
cooperation.
Good personal relations are decisive for the effectiveness of bilateral relations.
Coalition-building is influenced by the existence of traditional alliances and
geographical proximity.

Bilateral relations have always been in the logic of EU policy-making. They have
played a vital role in EU decision-making and are therefore important not only within the EU
but also in its external relations. However, Smith and Tsatsas see “a danger in overemphasizing bilateral initiatives. They may be vital for effective policy-making, but
achieving desired policy outcomes remains the key aim” (ibid.: xiii). In addition to creating
and implementing effective policies, bilateral cooperation frameworks bear the potential to
promote norms, motivate social learning and thus can help to bring about a paradigm shift in
a country’s policy making. Whether an organisation like the EU can act as a normative power
depends on two factors: First, the development of a norm such as sustainable development
needs a strong societal basis for two reasons. On the one hand, such a norm is considered a
legitimate basis for policy-making when it is accepted by a wide range of societal and
political actors. On the other hand, norms are promoted on both a political and societal level.
To avoid contradictory policies and activities, a strong consensus on a norm is important.
Second, the cooperating country must be willing to adopt such a norm. This is the basis for
identifying common interests and effective policy-making. The acceptance and adoption of
external norms does not only have to be by merely imitating but can also happen through the
process of norm localization. This provides a norm like sustainable development with more
legitimacy in the cooperating country and sets a long-term basis for future policy-making.
The main characteristics of the concepts of normative power and norm localization will be
discussed in the following section.
Normative Power Europe – How Norms are Spread and Localized
With his article “Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?”, Ian Manners (2002)
started a lively debate on the potential of the European Union to shape ideas and norms both
within and outside Europe. In the tradition of Europe as a civilian power (Maull 1990),
Europe’s power is not seen in the realm of military action. Rather, Europe is considered to
have the ideational power “to shape conceptions of ‘normal’ in international relations”
(Manners 2002: 239). The EU has a strong normative basis which guides EU policies and
external relations. Manners identifies five core norms and four minor, although far more
contested, norms. The first ones include peace, liberty, democracy, rule of law and human
rights. The minor norms refer to social solidarity, anti-discrimination, sustainable
development and good governance (Manners 2002: 242). He continues in his argumentation
by emphasizing the necessity not only to accept but to diffuse these norms in order to speak
of a normative power. There are six factors shaping the process of norm diffusion: contagion,
information, procedures, transference, overt diffusion and cultural filter (Manners 2002: 244245). Contagion refers to unintentional diffusion, meaning that the EU acts as an example of
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successful regional integration. The aspect of information centres upon strategic
communications, while procedures mean the institutionalization of a relationship with a third
party. Transference highlights the diffusion taking place when the EU practices its politics,
e.g. through the exchange of goods. Overt diffusion emphasizes the role of the EU through its
physical presence in a third country. Finally, norm diffusion is shaped by a cultural filter,
which is based on the “interplay between the construction of knowledge and the creation of
social and political identity” (Manners 2002: 245). The aspect of a cultural filter becomes
crucial in the literature on norm localization rather than norm diffusion. While norm diffusion
seen from a constructivist perspective of socialization is considered as a result of adaptive
behaviour, i.e. that “local practices are made consistent with an external idea”, localization
“describes a process in which external ideas are simultaneously adapted to meet local
practices” (Acharya 2004: 251). Acharya argues in favour of “a dynamic explanation of norm
diffusion that describes how local agents reconstruct foreign norms to ensure the norms fit
with the agents’ cognitive priors and identities” (ibid.: 239). Norm localization emphasizes
the role of domestic actors in determining the “reception of new global norms”, thus focusing
on political, organizational and cultural variables in the specific country or region (ibid.:
243). Localization shows three characteristics: framing, grafting and congruence of ideas.
Framing refers to the creation of issues, particularly through language. Grafting is understood
as associating new norms with pre-existing norms. In a final step, through re-interpretation
and re-representation of foreign norms, these norms are made congruent with prior local
norms. Congruence-building is done by so-called “norm takers” (ibid.: 244). In sum, Acharya
defines localization “as the active construction (through discourse, framing, grafting, and
cultural selection) of foreign ideas by local actors, which results in the former developing
significant congruence with local beliefs and practices” (ibid.: 245). Why foreign ideas are
adjusted can be traced back to three factors: strengthening of existing institutions, rational
exclusion of elements of new ideas to preserve the existing social order, enhance the profile
and prestige of local actors and beliefs (ibid.: 246). The willingness or necessity to localize
these foreign ideas can be found in the questioning of existing rules in context of a major
crisis, systemic change, domestic political change in the norm taker or because of an
international or regional demonstration effect (ibid.: 247). There are some conditions why
localization is pursued and some advantages attributed to this process. First, the localization
of foreign norms can improve legitimacy and authority of local actors without challenging
existing social identities. Second, the strength of pre-existing local norms will become
visible. Third, there must be local actors who are both credible and powerful in terms of
shaping the discourse. Finally, the norm-takers have to have a strong sense of identity, i.e.
they are aware of existing values and their uniqueness. (ibid.: 248-249)
The understanding for the process of norm localization becomes crucial when it
comes to the question of how to promote European norms in third countries to facilitate
cooperation. Past and current relations of the EU and member states to China show that
Chinese self-perception and values are key to their commitment in the area of, for instance,
climate change. In addition to taking the Chinese cultural and historical background into
account, the normative role of the EU in climate change issues highly depends on its own
developments in this respect (Scheipers/Sicurelli 2007:448). An ambitious climate change
policy will not only enforce the EU’s leadership in climate protection but being the global
best practice case will increase its credibility.
The EU’s identity-building with regard to climate change was influenced by the
opposing position of the U.S. under the Bush Administration. The more the U.S. opposed the
Kyoto Protocol the more unified the EU got and the more ambitious its policies were
formulated. It further strengthened its self-perception as the leading power in climate issues.
(Scheipers/Sicurelli 2007: 445-446). The EU thus became an attractive partner in the
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worldwide promotion of technology transfer, the exchange of know-how and the
enhancement of global and regional and national strategies for mitigation and adaptation
measures. Leading by example can thus be considered as the strongest power of the EU to
integrate other countries into multilateral efforts to mitigate and adapt to climate change. This
means the EU’s major strengths lie in its contribution to norm-spreading and institutionbuilding by using appropriate instruments such as multilateralism, diplomacy, precaution and
the establishment of binding rules through international law-making (Scheipers/Sicurelli
2007: 451-452).
Constructing norms and promoting them does not take place in a vacuum and norms
are not “a given”. From a European perspective, the norms shaping EU policies come from
civil society and political elites (Manners 2002: 251). These norms are then mostly delivered
through transnational and supranational organizations. Business as well has become decisive
in promoting norms through their activities and cooperation with businesses in other
countries. It is therefore likely that the process of norm localization takes place on three
levels: civil society, business and political elites. The question is not only to what extent these
norms are promoted through transnational or bilateral co-operations but also through which
actors and networks this is done. We should therefore ask who acts as a norm promoter from
a European perspective and who are the norm-takers or norm-localizers in China. This means
we have to, first, ask about the sources of norm creation on the European level and, second,
to identify the counterparts for norm localization in China. Finally, we can ask about the
relevance of these forms of cooperation in (a) promoting norms on sustainable development
and climate change in China and (b) the contribution of this alternative ways to
multilateralism in enhancing the global climate change regime.
In the following section, I will discuss the role of the EU as a norm promoter by
outlining the key aspects of its climate change policy. By showing leadership in climate
change policies and instruments, the EU has a best practice case as a solid basis for
promoting the norm of sustainable development. This will be followed by a brief introduction
into China's environmental problems as a trigger for an intensified cooperation with foreign
partners. In a subsequent step, I will outline the major cooperation frameworks between
China and the EU on the systemic level and continue with some examples of other
institutional cooperation such as between China and the European Environment Agency
(EEA) and the European Investment Bank (EIB). A first overview will be given on
cooperation on the sub-systemic level. In the research project, cooperation between business
actors and civil society actors will be analysed. In this paper, the focus will however be on
civil society.
Showing Leadership: The EU Policy on Climate Change
In 2008, the European Parliament and Council agreed on a “Climate Action and Renewable
Energy Package”, which was drafted by the European Commission. In this package, the
member states re-emphasized their commitment to the mitigation of and the adaptation to
climate change. The following goals were set out (European Commission 2009, 2009a,
2009b):
•

Cutting emissions to at least 20 per cent by 2020 compared to levels in 1990; member
states agreed to reduce emissions to 30 per cent if other developed countries agreed on
comparable reductions in a Post-Kyoto agreement. The instrument to be used is the
Emission Trading System (ETS). This instrument, which is in effect since 2005, has
to be strengthened. It is “the largest multi-country, multi-sector Greenhouse Gas
Emission Trading System world-wide” (European Commission 2009c).
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•

•
•
•
•
•
•

Cutting emissions of sectors excluded from the ETS (transport, agriculture, waste and
households) to 10 per cent compared to the level in 2005 by 2020. This has to be done
through binding national targets. With regard to transport, the aviation sector will be
integrated into the ETS from 2012 onwards. Furthermore, CO2 emissions from new
cars have to be reduced to an average of 130g per km.
Increasing energy use of renewable energy to 20 per cent by 2020. Having a 10 per
cent share for sustainably produced biofuels and other renewable fuels in transport.
Cutting energy consumption to 20 per cent by 2020 through improving energy
efficiency.
Promoting the development and safe use of Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS)
technology.
Increasing research and development in environment, energy and transport to further
enhance and promote clean technologies and to widen the understanding of climate
change and its impacts.
Reducing air pollution and health costs.
Increasing employment through the support and development of eco-industries.

The EU is a strong promoter of the norm of sustainable development, which becomes
visible in its efforts to tackle climate change. The EU has developed a leading position in the
global climate change regime and acts as a best-practice example with regard to its emission
trading system and the development of new technologies. The ambitious goals with regard to
CO2 emissions and the integration of further economic sectors into the ETS are promoted on
an international level. Nevertheless, in order to remain competitive on the global market, the
EU requires other developed countries to show similar efforts and wants developing countries
like China to agree on binding rules with regard to emission reductions. To underline the
EU’s own commitment to global climate protection, it would further increase its own
emission targets.
The EU has shown that climate protection can be economically beneficial through the
development of new industries and the creation of new jobs in addition to the implementation
of a successful emission trading scheme, which has not created significant economic
downturns. Furthermore, the EU enlargement process has illustrated that economic
development and environmental protection can be integrated. European environmental
standards had to be adopted and implemented by the new member states. To meet future
challenges in innovation, the EU opted for both push- and pull-strategies. The pull-strategies
include the development of a market value for greenhouse gases and the phasing out of
environmentally harmful subsidies. Moreover, the development and implementation of
market-based instruments should be facilitated. The push-strategies are composed of an
increase in financial support for innovative research and the establishment of public-privatepartnerships, especially to foster international cooperation (European Commission 2005).
Speaking in Manners’ terms: the EU promotes its norms through contagion, which
means that the EU acts as a successful example for the development of a sound climate
change policy that integrates economic and environmental policies to fight global warming.
The EU is however criticized for not fully using its potential through complex internal
negotiations (Gupta/Ringius 2001). Nevertheless, many countries consider the EU as a best
practice case. This picture is further promoted by the EU itself through international
cooperation, which the example of the EU-China relations on climate change shows. To
strengthen cooperation with a country like China, the EU seeks to give economic incentives,
to improve information exchange and communication structures, but a successful cooperation
also depends on China’s willingness to seriously participate in this. Such willingness is
further pushed through external factors like serious environmental degradation in China. This
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reality has been accepted by the Chinese government, which facilitates international
cooperation in this respect and also increases the likeliness of the Chinese government and
society to adopt and localize the norm of sustainable development. The next section will
briefly outline China’s most urgent environmental problems, which are also all related to
global warming.
Environmental Problems in China: A Catalyst for Cooperation?
Environmental problems in China are manifold and now bear the potential for social unrest
on a national level and diplomatic conflicts on an international level. In addition to (unequal)
economic growth and a huge population, the lack of political transparency and the
inequalities in the enforcement of environmental policies put further stress on the Chinese
environment (Edmonds 2008: 271, 295). The major environmental challenges that could be
identified for China are deforestation, water scarcity, desertification, flooding, soil erosion,
glacial retreat, population growth and pollution (Economy 2005: 204-205; Edmonds 2008:
271). All these problems are and will be intensified by climate change, which the IPCC report
clearly illustrated with regard to China (IPCC 2007). In 2008, the Chinese government
reacted to climate change issues and recently published its „White Paper: China's policies and
actions on climate change“ (Chinese Central Government 2009), in which they point out the
situation and impacts, develop strategies and objectives for addressing climate change and
laid out policies and actions decelerate and adapt to climate change. The government also
emphasizes the importance of enhancing public awareness and the necessity to cooperate
internationally.
The urgency of China's environmental problems including those caused and
intensified by climate change was underlined by a World Bank report in 2007. In this report,
the World Bank states that even though economic development has positively impacted on
the environment in terms of technology improvements, a changing industrial structure in
terms of energy efficiency and pollution control and general pollution control policies, the
environmental problems are pressing and cause a lot of costs. Increasing health problems,
crop and material damage through air and water pollution, deterioration of the water problem
would cost the Chinese government billions of dollars per year (World Bank 2007). China is
therefore interested in cooperation with both international institutions and other countries to
tackle its environmental problems. China has received strong assistance from the World
Bank, the Asian Development Bank (ADB), the Global Environmental Facility (GEF) and
Japan. They helped China in developing and implementing environmental protection work
such as monitoring systems, developing a legal system and analyzing energy alternatives
(Economy 2005: 209-210). Nevertheless, economic growth should not be compromised for
the sake of environmental protection. The best case scenario would therefore be to combine
continuing growth, democracy and environmental protection. The reality however shows a
different picture. This has once again become clear in the ongoing negotiation process of the
Post-Kyoto-Protocol. To assure China’s participation in a global climate change regime, not
only financial and economic incentives given by other countries and international institutions
to help China develop a “greener” economic structure are essential. Moreover, a fundamental
change in values is required (Economy 2005: 213). It is therefore necessary that the major
industrialized and polluting countries lead by example and actively contribute to the design of
“China’s environmental future” (Economy 2005: 214).
Here, the cooperation with the EU can become crucial. First, the EU has a strong
history in environmental protection and has developed expertise in instruments to combat
climate change. Second, the EU can act as a norm promoter with regard to sustainable
development and help to raise public awareness in China about environmental and climate
issues. Third, the EU has various possibilities to promote these norms – either through its
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official ways or through its member states. Finally, many actors including civil society and
business are and can be involved in fostering environmental and climate protection. Through
their work on the ground, it can be assumed that their assessment of potential cooperation
frameworks is more realistic and based on practical experience.
‘New Bilateralism’ to Fight Global Warming? The EU-China Relations on Climate
Change
Norm diffusion is facilitated through the establishment of strategic communications and the
institutionalization of bilateral relations, which then further supports this diffusion process
through concrete actions, i.e. transference. As I do not assume that the Chinese government
and society simply imitates and adopts the norm of sustainable development as stated by the
literature on norm diffusion, I argue that these are also the processes that trigger the process
of norm localization as interaction is a prerequisite for this.
A starting point for the analysis of EU-China relations on climate change is the “EU
and China Partnership on Climate Change”, which was established between the two parties in
September 2005 (European Commission 2005a). In the “Joint Declaration on Climate Change
between China and the European Union”, the EU and China set the agenda for future
cooperation on climate issues. Both parties seek to strengthen cooperation on climate change
policies through dialogue, practical co-operation in the fields of development, deployment
and transfer of clean technologies and the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM).
Furthermore, more cooperation is sought on research and analysis on the consequences of
climate change in addition to enhanced cooperation on capacity building and strengthening of
institutions through, e.g. raising public awareness and environmental education and training.
In parallel, the two parties agreed on “The China-EU Action Plan on Clean Coal” and “The
China-EU Action Plan on Industrial Co-operation on Energy Efficiency and Renewable
Energies”. The EU-China Rolling Work Plan (RWP) on Climate Change, which the two
parties agreed on in October 2006, serves as the major reference document in which they set
the agenda for further cooperation. The following forms of cooperation have been decided on
(European Commission 2006):
•
•

•

EU-China summit: ensuring high-level political follow-up and where necessary
provide further guidance.
Bilateral Consultation Mechanism: ensuring contacts at working level, involving
representatives from the Chinese Ministries concerned and the EU Troika (current and
future EU Presidency and Commission) to provide broader political coordination and
guidance for the implementation of the Partnership and strengthen their dialogue on
climate change policies and exchange views on key issues in the climate change
negotiations. This Mechanism shall meet at least once and where necessary twice
every year.
Direct cooperation between the EU environment counsellors group and relevant
Chinese ministries: the EU environment counsellors group will ensure coordination
between EU Member States and day to day follow-up of the Partnership.

In this document, the importance of bilateral sectoral cooperation under specifically
framed bilateral mechanisms was highlighted. I could be assumed that a broader cooperation
including the integration of not only political actors but also business and societal actors was
aspired to gather experts in their fields in order to establish effective cooperation in specific
areas. This was further emphasized through the recognition of priority areas (PA) in which
practical cooperation becomes crucial (European Commission 2006):
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•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Energy efficiency and energy conservation;
New and renewable energy;
Clean coal technologies and carbon dioxide capture and storage for near-zero
emissions power generation
Methane recovery and use
Hydrogen energy and fuel cells
Power generation, transmission and distribution
Clean Development Mechanism and other market-based instruments such as
Emissions Trading Schemes
Impacts of and adaptation to climate change
Capacity building, strengthening institutions and raising public awareness.

Based on this work plan, the following joint projects are currently listed on the
European Commission’s website (European Commission 2009):
•

•

•

•

EU-China CDM Facilitation Project to strengthen the Clean Development Mechanism
(CDM) as a central pillar of sustainable development in China. The establishment and
improvement of China’s policy and regulatory frameworks in addition to quality
management of the CDM process will be the key areas of cooperation.
Carbon Capture and Storage (“Zero-Emission” Demonstration Plant) to promote
“practical cooperation on the development, deployment and transfer of clean fossil
fuels technologies, to improve energy efficiency and to achieve a low carbon
economy”. There are currently two feasibility studies on CCS (Carbon Dioxide
Capture and Storage) in process. First, the Near Zero Emission Coal (NZEC) project
and the COACH project (Cooperation Action with CCS China-EU)2. These projects
are supported by the STRACO2-project (Support to Regulatory Activities for Carbon
Capture and Storage). The activities will be continued in a phase two and three, which
will, first, specifically focus on site-specific design and feasibility studies, and,
second, focus on the construction and operation of a demonstration plant with CCS
technology.
The EU-China Energy and Environment Programme (EEP) seeks to promote
sustainable energy use and thus to improve the environmental and health conditions in
China.
There are regular meetings under the Bilateral Consultation Mechanisms, the EUChina NZEC Steering Committee, annual summits, official visits, study visits, joint
workshops and expositions.

Under the umbrella of the European Environment Agency (EEA), several smaller
projects have been pursued such as the China (Kunming) Environmental Protection and
Renewable Energy Exposition, the China Europa 2009 or the China Carbon Trade Summit
20093. This trade summit is an interesting institution as it seeks to serve as a networking
arena for senior executives, tradesmen and environment and technique expert to discuss
issues relevant for carbon industry. China has become an important player in the CDM
market, now covering 51 per cent of the global CDM trading market. China is therefore an
2

For further information on these programmes see NZEC, http://www.nzec.info and COACH, http://www.co2coach.com (07.06.2009).
3
For further information on these events see China (Kunming) Environmental Protection and Renewable
Energy
Exposition,
http://technologies.ew.eea.europa.eu/Events/eve204704;
China
Europa
2009,
http://www.eea.europa.eu/events/china-europa
or
the
China
Carbon
Trade
Summit
2009,
http://ccts.cbichina.com/english.html (07.06.2009).
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attractive partner for foreign investment to reduce carbon emissions. This is a good example
to illustrate business interest climate change policy.
At the 10th China-EU Summit in 2007, political leaders decided on the establishment
of a China-EU Clean Energy Centre. The objective is to strengthen cooperation on energy
efficiency and on exploring new clean technologies2. The commitment to combat climate
change through joint projects was reaffirmed at the 11th EU-China Summit in 2009. In
context of the summit in 2007, the European Investment Bank (EIB) considered to offer
China a EUR 500 million framework loan, the China Climate Change Framework Loan
(CCCFL) to invest in projects combating climate change (Presidency of the European Union
2007). This loan now provides China with a total of EUR 220 million that will assist the
Chinese government in investing in projects helping to mitigate climate change. The funding
of projects includes forestation programmes, the construction of wind farms and energy
efficiency and pollution reduction. These projects shall all be registered under the Clean
Development Mechanism (European Union 2009d).
The general and by far not exhaustive illustration of EU-China cooperation on climate
change shows that the emphasis is put on the transfer of technology and know-how through
joint research projects, practical cooperation and investment programmes. The political
framework is set and developed through regular dialogue and bilateral consultation
mechanisms and high-level summits, which further emphasize both parties’ commitment to
this process. The projects also meet strong business interests such as in the carbon market,
clean energy technology and renewable energies. The EU thus integrates China into the
global combat of climate change through financial and economic incentives, which are in the
end beneficial to both sides. The question remains whether this rather technical and economic
cooperation also leads to a re-thinking about the relationship between economic development
and environmental protection, i.e. following the path of sustainable development rather than
treating the economic and ecological sphere separately. This leads us back to the initial
question of the EU as normative power acting through various channels on the systemic and
sub-systemic level. So far, I have briefly outlined cooperation that primarily takes place on
the systemic level between the EU and China. The illustration of the EEA's activities
emphasized the role of business in promoting climate protection measures. In addition to the
political and business level of cooperation, there is also civil society cooperation on climate
change issues. Under the framework of new bilateralism, the research agenda of this project
is to analyze the diverse actors, agendas and instruments. In the following section, I will give
a first overview of some civil society cooperation frameworks.
Civil Society: Actors, Agendas and Instruments
A first entrance point for the exploration of EU-China civil society relations is the EU-China
Civil Society Forum. As stated on the forum's website, the main objective is „to foster the
development of relations between the EU, its members and China and to ensure that their
relations promote social justice, contribute to the protection of the environment and
strengthen human rights“ (EU-China Civil Society Forum 2009). To achieve this goal, the
forum wants to enable informed public debate, assist political institutions within the EU and
its member states in building relations to China based on principals like social and ecological
justice and human rights, ensure the maintenance of labour and environmental standards in
business activities and to increase cooperation between and among civil society groups in the
context of EU-China relations. This network is run by civil society organizations from
Germany, Austria, France and Belgium. Cooperation partners in China differ depending on
the topic. With regard to the environment, the following organizations are listed:
•

Center for Biodiversity and Indigenous Knowledge (Kunming, China)
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•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

CANGO-China Association for NGO Cooperation (Beijing, China)
Roots&Shoots (Beijing, China)
Green Watershed (Kunming, China)
Green Stone (Nanjing, China)
Animal Asia Foundation (Hong Kong, China)
The Green Volunteer League of Chongqing (Chongqing, China)
Green Earth Volunteers (Beijing, China)
Xinjiang Conservation Fund (Beijing, China)
Moving Mountains (Beijing, China)

If we take a closer look at the Chinese organizations listed, the most interesting one
with regard to the networking aspect is CANGO. The aim of CANGO is to provide a
platform for the exchange of information and experience for Chinese NGOs working on
poverty alleviation, environmental protection and social development. CANGO also seeks to
“broaden corporative channels between CANGO and government, business, and research
institutes” and also acts “as an intermediary agency and partners with foreign NGOs, bilateral
and multilateral organizations and Chinese NGOs to enhance fundraising, provision of
technical support and capacity building of grassroots NGOs in China” (CANGO 2009). In
addition to various European-based organizations and institutes (and other international and
foreign organizations and institutions), the European Commission is part of the partners and
donors of CANGO, which means that there is a close affiliation from the EU to this network.
The agendas of these civil society organizations and networks are diverse. Their role
is to promote a better understanding for environmental issues including environmental
protection, conservation and climate change. They are diverse in their constitution and
missions but they share similar goals, namely to protect the environment on a local, national
and global level. As most of the NGO umbrella organizations, CANGO has the potential to
support exchange of the various existing environmental NGOs in China and link them with
foreign NGOs and transnational networks in addition to providing them access to government
and business actors to strengthen their lobbying capacities. A crucial role of NGOs is also
public information and education. A wider network can assist them in professionalizing in
public relations and information management. NGOs and other civil society groups can
therefore act as norm takers as they are rooted in their society and are accustomed with its
values and ideas so that external norms can be localized. To what extent this can happen and
what the EU can contribute in this respect has to be further analyzed on the basis of personal
interviews.
Conclusion
EU-China relations can significantly contribute to a strengthening of the global climate
change regime beyond international negotiations under the UNFCCC. As it is difficult to
integrate a country like China into an international agreement with binding regulations on
emission reductions, the EU as a best practice example for the integration of economic and
environmental policies with regard to climate change can act as a normative power. This
means, the EU can first show leadership in the field of climate change policy and illustrate
how significant emission reductions are possible without challenging high economic
performance. Second, the EU can assist China in developing and deploying new clean
technologies and help to direct its economic growth in a sustainable way. And, third, by
promoting its norm of sustainable development (and climate protection being part of it)
through the its activities and the institutionalization of EU-Chinese relations, the EU can help
in raising awareness for climate change issues and to show ways in dealing with this problem.
The potential for a paradigm shift in Chinese policies and thinking increases the more
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interaction there is between European and Chinese actors on a political, business and civil
society level. It is however more probable that the Chinese government and society localize
the norm of sustainable development than merely imitating and adopting European norms
without embedding them into local traditions. If a norm is localized, it will be more accepted
within politics and society. It is therefore not only more enduring but also more likely to
bring about a cognitive shift. If this happens, China’s participation in multilateral negotiations
on climate change policy will positively alter, which will be beneficial for the promotion of a
global climate change regime. That such bilateral cooperation has the potential to act in the
way of norm diffusion or norm localization and to act as a catalyst for further commitment on
the multilateral level could already have been observed during the pre-negotiations in Bali
2007, when China accepted to talk about quantitative reduction goals in upcoming
negotiations. Copenhagen 2009 will show how strong this commitment finally is and which
are the influential factors in getting a turning point in global climate change policy-making.
The role of “new bilateralism” for the strengthening of a global climate change regime
in addition to the questions of how Europe can act as a normative power and to what extent
the norm of sustainable development in the context of climate change is localized in China on
the political, business and civil society level will be further analyzed in this research project.
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